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DEFINING THE SCOPE OF THE
EXPRESSION
Contract is the instrument through which agreements
can be made on how to regulate all relationships relating
around athletes’ performances in regard to the
expectations of those (individuals, clubs, national
federations, etc) who employ them. This is the strict, and
perhaps most traditional, interpretation of the expression
“sports contracts” that over the course of time has
acquired a new, more encompassing meaning – ie to
include all stipulations related to the manifold aspects of
sport, whether they touch upon the proper athletic
activities and ensuing obligations on the part of the
performers and organisers, or deal with the exploitation of
rights stemming from their broadcast, circulation,
publication, etc. The latter is typical of the discipline that
connects sport to its representation by the media; an
entirely novel field of legal knowledge and analysis is
developing with reference to this phenomenon and the
difficult issues it poses in terms of, for example, the
determination of the applicable law, the identification of
the holder of those rights, and the weight to be attributed
to the public interest to have free and live access to sport
events as they take place.
The aim of this article is to focus upon the classical
notion of sports contracts, and consequently to take
account of the way relationships between athletes and their
employers may be governed in particular legal systems.
Particular attention is given to understanding the nature of
such contracts, the protection they are able to give to the
weakest party to them, and their implementation within
sports bodies. The Italian experience of sports contracts –
both their legislative origin and the way they have grown
within specialised organisations – is central to the
following analysis.
A VIEW OF THE ITALIAN EXPERIENCE
The first issue that has given rise to mounting
controversy over the years is the nature of the bond
originating from the commitment between the parties (the
performer and the employer) to the contract in question.
The specific questions that the Italian legal system was
called upon to answer were as follows: is there sufficient
significant and tangible contractual freedom in the
organisation of the performance on the part of the athlete
to allow him/her the legal status that accrues to self-
employment, or should he/she be treated as an employee
depending on the other party’s power to direct his/her
work and making him/her liable to the latter’s discipline
and all the other features of an employer/employee
relationship? The significance of the consequences deriving
from acceptance of either thesis was self evident, as they
would reflect on the liberty of the performer to lend
independently (or sell, some could say) his/her sporting
abilities to whomever he/she would select for a chosen
period of time and without any other obligation to the
other party other than to perform at his/her best in order
to give due value for the agreed fee.
On one side of the coin was the athlete’s deprivation of the
essential forms of protection enjoyed by employees in terms
of stability, medical care, insurance, etc. On the other, the
price to be paid was the recognition of the employer’s right
to negotiate his/her performances with third parties within a
sphere of established guarantees as to the termination of the
contract, the maintenance of previous salaries, expression of
satisfaction at the proposed transfer, etc.
The extent of the expectations and alarms which arose
as a consequence of the dilemma was so palpable that it
took an Act of Parliament to erase all doubts and provide
clear and unequivocal guidance to this heated issue.
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
The law of 23 March 1981 no 91, which governs the
relationship between clubs and professionals operating in
this particular field, sets out the general framework which
addresses the key legal implications arising from the
sporting activities in question. This law has delivered
reasonable stability, and the main aspects are summarised
below.
The first fundamental affirmation of principle provides
that the exercise of sport, both in an individual or collective
form and whether professional or not, must be free – that
is not only unconditionally discharged, but (according to
the best statutory interpretation) open and accessible to all
citizens.
The other boundary characterising the legal governance
of sport consists of the clear definition of those subjected
to its discipline under the head of sports professionals –
athletes, trainers, managers, etc – provided each of them
acts for economic purposes and in a continuous way inside
the appropriate national federation, and abides by its rules.
Before turning to the provisions affecting sports
contracts and their consequences, it must be made clear
Sports contracts in Italy
by Mario Serio
that the regulations emanating from the Italian National
Olympic Committee (Comitato Olimpico Nazionale
Italiano - CONI) and applicable to its affiliated federations
are central to the debate. This demonstrates that even if
sports contracts fall within the dogmatic domain of private
law, they operate within a public law scenery.
A further consequence of this relationship between law
and sport is that in order to issue a valid contract all clubs
must belong to a national federation affiliated to CONI.
Any activity by clubs in violation of CONI rules could lead
to them being disaffiliated or facing some other form of
severe disciplinary sanctions. If clubs responsible for severe
infringements were expelled by their federations all their
contracts with professional athletes would automatically be
severed. The latter would see their contractual freedom
immediately restored, and could negotiate with other clubs.
THE SPIRIT OF SPORTS CONTRACTS AND
ITALIAN LEGISLATION
As explained earlier in this article, the essential problem
the Italian legislation was faced with resolving following a
prolonged and heated debate was to choose between a
contractual configuration echoing self-employment, with
the consequent risk incumbent on athletes in terms of the
lack of a stable and protected relationship with the other
party, or the adoption of contracts of service (as opposed
to those for the rendering of a service).
In theory, neither option should have been precluded as
both were capable of conforming to the general principles
governing the law of contract; in particular, it was felt that
sports performers could, in an ideal world, benefit from all
liberties accruing to them from the free exercise of their
activity, starting with the selection of the counterparty and
the length of time of his/her obligation. But no-one was in
any doubt over the intrinsically political nature of the
question –and political it unequivocally was.
The starting point of the legislative construction was the
express definition of a contract of sporting services as an
employment contract subject to the treatment contained in
the legislation. But this principled choice did not prevent
the development of sports agreements which qualified
their content to take account of model contracts for the
rendering of a service. The circumstances that surround
such a qualification of sports contracts may involve a
number of peculiarities, such as the sporadic, or one-off,
nature of the performance and the lack of any
subordinating power of the club towards the athlete.
So the root to this exception lies deep in the fact that
performances are occasional and, as such, do not require a
substantial and constant subjection of the performer to the
organising and directing faculties of the other party. That
being said, the typically distinct nature of a sports contract
reflects the political and protective attitude towards who is
thought of as the weaker party of the relationship, ie the
performing athlete whose position has been judged as
being worthy of the specific remedies normally associated
with contractual services. However, it should be
emphasised that all contracts of this kind are basically
onerous in nature.
Another characteristic of the protective attitude
supporting the legislation is apparent in the compulsory
written form that is required for the contract to be valid.
As for the content, the parties to the contract have to make
recourse to the standard form that is drafted by the
federations for general use, subject to a renewal process
every three years. No derogatory clause – that is a clause
making the performer’s position worse or, at least, less
favourable – is allowed with respect to the corresponding
stipulation contained in the standard form; in the event of
a contract containing such a derogatory clause being
signed, the original clause will be automatically inserted.
The only area where significant latitude is given to
the employer is that which entitles him/her to give
technical instructions to be followed by the athlete in the
course of their training.
An arbitration clause may be agreed between the
parties: in practice, the tool is regarded as being binding on
both parties by the federations’ regulations, forbidding any
recourse to state justice before all disputes have been ruled
on by sports justice bodies instituted by the federations or
CONI. No passing off clause is tolerated, nor one which
unduly purports to restrain an athlete’s freedom to select a
new employer once the original contract is terminated.
The contract may be assigned from one club to
another before it expires, on condition that the performer
is willing to do so and all dispositions emanating from the
relevant federations are complied with. Special measures
are applied for the benefit of young athletes’ clubs in whose
favour a bonus (or premium) is guaranteed to be paid – in
accordance with the federations’ rules – by the club to
whom the former is transferred. The bonus is required to
be re-invested by its beneficiary for the pursuance and
enhancement of its sports purposes.
At the same time, the clubs that have originally trained
young athletes are empowered to draft their first
professional contract at the end of the trial period in
accordance with the rules laid out by the relevant
federation, taking into account varying factors such as age
and the specific features of each individual sport. Sports
contracts as framed by Italian law reflect the main
characteristics of labour law when building an effective
framework to protect the worker’s position with respect to
the employer. All forms of treatment, benefits and
guarantees are conferred upon professional and amateur
performers as regards medical care and pensions, along
with insurance covering any risk incurred in the course of
employment which could jeopardize their careers.
It cannot be doubted that full equivalence has, at the
end of the day, been established between typical contracts26
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of employment and sports contracts, notwithstanding the
different level of earnings that may derive from either of
them and the generally better and more comfortable
conditions that go with the latter. This may explain why
public sentiment towards the category of sportsmen falling
within the contemplation of the statute law under
discussion is not particularly benevolent or generous, as
they are perceived as receivers of perks inside a golden
world very far apart from the real world where their fellow
workers live.
SPORTS CONTRACTS AND SPORTS LAW
The picture that has emerged thus far through this short
analysis of the legislative provision is by itself far from being
faithfully representative of the athletes’ actual legal
position. One overall premise has to be made so that a
satisfactory understanding of the functioning of the sports
legal system in Italy can be gained.
It is a well established and deeply rooted principle that
sport can give rise to a complex and widespread system,
composed of human resources as well as financial means
and material support, that badly needs a coherent set of
rules to be applied in everyday life to govern the numerous
and often complicated relationships operating within its
parameter and affecting so many individuals’ and legal
entities’ lives and interests. In consequence, over a long
time span an autonomous and characteristic body of
dispositions, regulations and rules has evolved – some of
which effectively amount through the broadness of their
true content to general principles – confined to people and
institutions operating in sport. Thus the novel and
substantive branch of law that is sports law was born.
The problem is, and has always been, to try and erect a
safe and clearly recognisable dividing line between this
branch and the general law, particularly private and
administrative law. Disputes have repeatedly arisen over
which areas sports law may be deemed legitimately to
operate without inadmissibly interfering with the general
prerogative of the common state law.
The other side of this problematic area is to ascertain
what general law norms could and should not be set aside
within the legal management of sport: the question may be
viewed from the opposite perspective and one may also
wonder what, if any, kind of enforcement the general legal
system is ready to provide in respect to rules, decisions,
and sanctions belonging to the sport legal system. This has
been particularly true of judgments passed by sports’
courts that from time to time have become the object of
further litigation by some of those subjected to the legal
rules of sports federations who have sought to have them
overturned by ordinary state courts. The very validity of
the binding clause obliging all those operating in the sports
world strictly to observe its rules and not to opt out in
favour of the general state jurisdiction has been
questioned.
Even the highest courts of justice in Italy have been
called upon to resolve these intricacies, and the legislator
has had to intervene in recent times (2003) to put an end
to long-running controversies between members of the
sports system, and possibly give some fruitful and easily
accessible guidelines in order to determine where the
jurisdiction of sports bodies ceases and state law takes over.
Controversial as the question may sound, a certain
proportion of shared consent has been agreed for the
purpose of distinguishing the boundaries of sports law not
to be trespassed on by state law as they constitute the most
sophisticated and coveted frontier of the free exercise of
the power of those who belong to the sports world to give
it the legal structure they please – provided that no
fundamental or general principle of state law (starting from
the Constitution) is put into peril or weakened or
abandoned. In particular, practitioners and commentators
agree on the issue of the independent handling by sporting
subjects of all technical evaluations, conducted through
legal instruments available in sports law, regarding sports
events and individual and collective behaviour at such
occasions, with the obvious exception of the matter of
public order and criminal offences.
The topic of sports contracts is further developed and
defined by the integration of legislative measures with rules
made by the competent bodies acting in the sports world,
particularly the national federations. Their regulations tend
to give a more specific and detailed character to provisions
contained in Parliamentary legislation, and they regulate
certain vital aspects concerning the relationships between
the performer and the employer as they are typically built
in some sectors of sport, football being one example.
The national federations’ regulations are often the
product of the adoption of general principles and
provisions laid down by CONI in the performance of its
role of supervising the activity and organisation of all
federations. Some dispositions may vary from one
federation to another as far as particular aspects of sports
contracts (technical rules, procedural aspects, organising
methods, etc) are concerned, but there is a common core
of fundamental principles put forward by CONI that
cannot be overlooked, let alone misapplied or ignored.
Examples of this include the provision of adequate
measures to secure a reasonable chance for all performers
to have all disputes with employers concerning their
contractual rights fairly settled within their federation’s
jurisdiction, and to be entitled to a final appeal before the
newly instituted Tribunal for the Arbitration of Sports
Disputes, acting under the auspices of the Italian Olympic
Committee.
A notable example of the attention paid by a single
federation to sports contract matters is provided by the
regulations of the Italian Football Federations regarding
the settlement of economic disputes. They are discussed
before different specialised committees, depending on 27
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whether players and clubs are involved or only clubs, whose
decisions and awards are self-executing and directly
binding on the parties: in the event that they are not
observed, varying sanctions are applied within the
federations which may result, if a very serious offence has
taken place and the player’s economic right has been
severely infringed, in the club responsible being deducted
points in its league table or even banned. That is an
illustration of the importance that is attached to the
protection and enforcement of contractual rights by Italian
sports authorities at all levels.
The proactive nature of the Italian system for the
administration of sports justice has been further illustrated
by recent developments in the procedure for the final
settlement of economic disputes. A new weapon has
recently been granted by CONI for dissatisfied parties,
who may ask for their case to be reheard before the
National Arbitration Tribunal after all possible avenues
have been pursued within the competent federation.
It is still uncertain if the proceedings should have the
power to rescind previous judgments by the courts in the
manner of an appellate court, or be classified as an award
containing a new adjudication induced by the parties’ fresh
representations and submissions rather than errors made
by the courts acting within the relevant federations. It must
also be taken into consideration that these proceedings can
only be put in motion if all parties have previously agreed
to take their disputes to an arbitration tribunal acting
outside the ambit of the national sports federations (but
well inside the general area covered by CONI). It could not
be ruled out that, in theory at least, a federation may be
reluctant to make recourse to this kind of arbitration (but
in practice one cannot see many, if any, such instances as
CONI cannot give its prior approval to such a refusal).
But at the end of the day, in the event of the party’s
request to have a new judgment passed by the National
Tribunal for Sports Arbitration being upheld, a different
distribution of rights would eventually occur and a
reshaping of the sports legal system would be perceived as
the inevitable outcome of the enlargement of remedies for
the protection of (inter alia) sports contractual rights.
Providing all parties operating in the sports world with
another instrument to help them defend their contractual
rights would surely lessen the chances of their seeking state
justice rather then the system offered by the organisation
to which they belong.
Furthermore, all judicial proceedings before courts
operating on behalf of all the federations should take into
account a number of essential principles that CONI has
borrowed from the general state law, such as the right to a
fair and speedy trial, the due process clause, the double
jeopardy rule, no hearsay rules etc. An analogy can be
drawn with the corresponding rules coming from
international sports governing bodies such as CIO, FIFA,
UEFA, etc.
CONCLUSION
One final remark leads us to a tentative conclusion in an
area where dynamic adjustments and changes usually
happen at such a pace that their implications are hard to
grasp. The sports legal systems have made some valuable,
though not always satisfactory or conducive, efforts with a
view to preventing or eliminating any possible conflict with
state law over their respective jurisdictions. In this
reciprocal respect for each other’s domain, and the
undeniable prevalence of the fundamental, general
principles of the law applicable to all citizens, paradoxically
lies the strongest barrier for defending the lasting
autonomy of sports law as a branch of law relying on its
own principles and structures and addressing all the people
whose jobs and interests are linked to sport.
• This article is taken from a presentation given by the
author at the International Academy of Legal Science
conference held at the University of Istanbul on May
14, 2010.
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